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RECENT FEDERAL CASE
Search and Seizure-Due Process of Law-Municipal Health InspectionsFrank v. Maryland, 79 Sup.Ct. 804 (1959).
Answering a complaint, an inspector from the Baltimore health department searched defendant's neighborhood. After finding evidence behind
defendant's home that suggested rats were inside, the inspector requested
entry of defendant, which was refused. The inspector left and returned the
next day for further exterior examination of the home but, not finding
defendant there, again made no entry. Within a few days defendant was
arrested, tried by a magistrate, convicted, and fined twenty dollars for
violation of a Baltimore health ordinance requiring householders to admit
health inspectors. The Baltimore Criminal Court affirmed the conviction,
the Maryland Supreme Court denied certiorari, and defendant brought the
case to the United States Supreme Court on certiorari. The issue, never
before decided by the Supreme Court, was whether Maryland could, tonsistently with the due process clause of the Constitution, 2 require dwellers
of private homes to admit health inspectors without search warrants. In an
opinion by Justice Frankfurter s the Court held such requirement constitutional. Repeating its famous dictum in Wolf v. Colorado' that the due
process clause protects a right of "privacy," the Court then made it plainer
than it did in the Wolf case that this right is the freedom from "unreasonable
searches and seizures" guaranteed by the fourth amendment. 5 On this base
it found the Baltimore ordinance to impose a "reasonable" search, mainly
because no evidence of crime was sought, 6 and also because there had to be
I BLTromz MD., Crry CODr, art. XII, § 120: 'Whenever the Commissioner of
Health shall have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may demand entry therein in the day time, and if the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination, he shall forfeit
and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty Dollars.' Other sections of the code
require dwellings to be kept clean and sanitary and free of vermin and rodent infestation and impose penalties for failing to do so.
2 U.S. CoNsT., Amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .....
' The decision was 5-4, with Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan
joining the dissent written by Justice Douglas. Justice Whittaker wrote a brief
concurring opinion.
4 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5N.B. that the Frank case does not, any more than the Wolf case, indicate that the
entire fourth amendment is read into the due process clause. Nor does it give any
hint of extension of any other of the first eight amendments into the fourteenth.
EIf unhealthy conditions are found, the occupant is informed of that fact and asked
to correct them. If he fails to do so, he is then subject to criminal prosecution. This
raises a point upon which the Frank case is not clear. The criminal prosecution would
be for maintaining the unhealthy condition, which is a nuisance. Apparently evidence
for this prosecution would have to be obtained by a separate second search under a
search warrant. If the health inspector could testify as to the conditions he observed
on the first inspection, this would seem to be the obtaining of evidence of crime without
a warrant. However, the Court's statement that no evidence of crime was sought to be
seized appears to have been intended to mean the only testimony or other evidence
admissible would have been that produced by a second search. Those who wish to rely
on the case should by all means assume that to be the fact
A related issue not discussed by the majority or dissenting opinions arises from the
fact that knowledge of unsanitary conditions discovered during the inspection might
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valid reason to suspect a health nuisance, the inspection had to be in the
daytime, and the inspector could not use force to enter. Justice Douglas,
in his dissenting opinion, argued that the fourth amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures insured absolute privacy in one's
home, subject only to the power of police to enter under a valid warrant in
an emergency in their duty, such as to continue hot pursuit of a felon.
In 1950 the Supreme Court was faced with the same health inspection
issue in District of Columbia z. Little but, as it frankly stated, purposely
avoided the constitutional question by deciding the case on a collateral
ground.8 However, if it is any indication of the Court's feeling at that time,
the practical effect of the case was to leave intact the decision of the District
of Columbia Circuit,9 which had denied validity to the inspection statute.
Other than the Little case, only two American cases, both state decisions
1
rendered after that case, seem to have squarely faced the Frank issue.2
Both expressly repudiated the circuit court opinion in the Little case and
reached the result of the Frank case on parallel reasoning. Givner v. State

of Marykand1 ' is an identical prologue to the Frank case, involving a similar

violation of the: same Baltimore ordinance. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price,= a
1958 Ohio decision involving a comparable fact situation arising from the
refusal of a householder to admit a Dayton health inspector, mirrors the
Givner case, relying on it implicitly. Both Givner and Price, like Frank,
operate on the principle that health inspections are "reasonable" searches.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Frank v. Maryland based no part of
its decision upon Little, Givner, or Price and did not even discuss them. '
Whether its failure to seek support from the Givner and Pricecases, which
certainly could well have been cited, since their rationale is like that used by
the Supreme Court, indicates a desire not to give a broad sanction to health
inspection statutes not before the Court, may be worth speculation. As for
the circuit court decision in the Little case, it is difficult to see how it can
stand, even though not expressly disposed of, in the face of the diametrically
opposed result in the Frank case.
In assessing the Frank decision, two separate lines of inquiry can be
made: the judicial precedents on search and seizure, and the historical
be used as the basis for obtaining a warrant for a second search. Thus, even if the
first inspection did not produce evidence, it would be connected with a later search
which would do so. The Frank case does not indicate defendant attacked the inspection
ordinance on this ground, and clearly the Court did not examine the question.
7 339 U.S. 1 (1950) (defendant arrested for refusing admittance to D.C. health
inspector
who had no warrant).
8
It held Mrs. Little's resistance did not constitute refusal of entry within the
meaning of the D.C. statute.

9178 F.2d 13 (1949). This decision, relied on by Justice Douglas in his dissent in
Frank, held it was an unreasonable search for a health inspector to enter a private
home
10 without a warrant.
See also Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E2d 683 (1955), which
discusses the issue in dictum, agreeing with the Frank result.
11210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
12
168 Ohio St 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958).
1
3 The majority did not cite Little or Priceand only cited Givner in a footnote for a
minor collateral proposition. Justice Douglas dealt with Little at length in his dissent.
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antecedents to the fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure. The investigation of prior cases will be made first.
Since Wolf v. Colorado, supra, it has been accepted that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause imposes upon states a duty not to engage in
invasions of privacy, similar to the fourth amendment restraints on the
federal government. Despite broad language in some cases, 1 it is clear
that the freedom from search and seizure is far from absolute, even as to
searches of dwellings. Further, statements made about it have, without
exception, been in cases where the search or seizure was for criminal or
quasi-criminal evidence. The farthest extension of fourth amendment protection has been in connection with searches of homes, perhaps the outermost limit being McDonald v. United States,5 holding that a suspect's
apartment could not be searched incident to his valid arrest there when the
arrest was without a warrant. It has, however, been repeatedly held that
the premises within a suspect's control may be searched without a warrant
when he is arrested there on a valid arrest warrant, 16 though this is of
V 17
And the arrest must actually
course not so when the arrest is invalid.
occur at the home." Apparently the search may be for evidence of crimes
other than that for which the arrest was made, though this should not be
stated dogmatically.1 ' Nevertheless, the point is made that the fourth
amendment allows some latitude in searches of private homes without
warrants.
The language of the fourth amendment-the people secure in their
"persons, houses, papers, and effects"-does not itself indicate any preferential protection of the home. Nor does it seem the Supreme Court intended
such a preference when it began its series of great interpretive cases around
the turn of this century. For instance, Gouled v. United States,20 which held
a search of an office invalid, was made the basis of the decision in Amos v.
United States,2 decided the same day, which similarly dealt with a .search
'4 See for example: Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("the security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. .. is basic to a free society") ;

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("the search of a private dwelling
without a warrant is, in itself, unreasonable and abhorrent...").
15335

AMUcA

STATES OF
U.S. 451 (1948). CoRwiN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNY
825 (1953), advances the view that United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56

(1950), may have overruled McDonald by implication. This may not be necessarily
so, since the arrest in Rabinowitz was with a valid arrest warrant. Further, the
Rabinowitz case involved a search of an office, which, as this Casenote attempts to
develop, may be a distinction of some current vitality.
16 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
17 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
18 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
19 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The arrest was for forgery, and
the search, held valid, uncovered illegally held draft cards, which became the basis of
a criminal charge. The Court said, at 150, "This Court has pointed out that it is only
unreasonable searches and seizures which come within the constitutional interdict"

However, the Court dwelt on the fact that the draft cards were government property,
which its agents had a right to recover; thus, there may be a special reason, not likely
to be repeated, for the "reasonableness" of the search.
20 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (search of office under subterfuge of friendly visit).
21255 U.S. 313 (1921) (search of home for bootleg whisky without warrant).
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of a home. The patriarch in this area is Boyd v. United States,2 2 decided in
1885 and cited in nearly every fourth amendment case since. It held that
compulsory production of business records amounted to a search and
seizure, which, in a quasi-criminal forfeiture action, was violative of the
fourth amendment. However, the Court has for a number of years allowed
police much broader powers in searching vehicles than in searching homes
or offices, it being the rule that an automobile may be searched without a
warrant if there is probable cause to suspect it contains evidence of a
crime.25 Of more importance to the present discussion, there has been a
recent trend in the Court toward lessening the protection given businesses
and business records. A proponent of this is Justice Douglas, his views
being shown clearly in his opinion in Davis v. United States 2 which upheld
a seizure of gasoline rationing coupons, a major argument relied upon being
that the search was of a business, not a private home. A more important
aspect of this picture is brought out by News Printing Co. v. Walling, 2s
which, stripped of its trappings, held a federal agency could conduct a
fishing expedition to uncover evidence of criminal violation of wage and
hour laws by compelling production of corporate records, even though it
had no probable cause to suspect the crime had occurred. It was said that,
"if applicable" to corporations, the fourth amendment did not prohibit this
kind of search, it being a reasonable balancing of public interest against the
company's protection against searches and seizures. The spirit and language
of the case raise doubts as to what it did to Boyd v. United States, supra,
and to cases such as Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,2 which
clearly hold corporations are protected by the fourth amendment.
The most obvious difference between Frank v. Maryland and the fourth
amendment cases just discussed is that it does not involve a search for
criminal evidence, while they do. That fact suggests it may have more
affinity to cases involving the abatement of health nuisances by public
officials. The Supreme Court has suggested that the power of organs of
state or local government to seize and destroy nuisances preceded the
fourth amendment.Y So it has been held states or their subdivisions sum22116 U.S. 616 (1885).
2
3

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of known bootleggers' car

for whisky).

24 328 U.S. 582 (1946). Compare the language Justice Douglas used there in playing

down the sanctity of searches of businesses with the adamant stand he took against
searches
of private homes in the Frank case.
25
Printed together with Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946). Though the Oklahoma Press case is more often cited, News Printingactually
extends federal inquisitory power further, because there was no probable cause to
suspect a violation of federal law in News Printing, while there was probable cause

in Oklahoma Press. The opinion is by Justice Rutledge, with both Justices Frankfurter
and Douglas joining.
26251 U.S. 385 (1920) (search of corporate office after officers had been arrested at
home held unlawful search).
27 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 142 (1894) (seizure in public waters of illegally
maintained fish nets): "So, the summary abatement of nuisances without judicial
process or proceeding was well known to the common law prior to the adoption of the

constitution, and it has never been supposed that the constitutional provision in question
in this case [due process clause of fourteenth amendment] was intended to interfere
with the established principles in that regard."
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manly may seize fish nets illegally maintained in public waters,28 seize and
destroy allegedly spoiled poultry from a cold storage plant,29 and forcibly
enter a barn to test cows for tuberculosis.30 Despite the similarity of these
situations, the Frank case does not reason from the abatement-of-nuisance
ground, preferring to discuss the health inspection issue in a pure search
and seizure framework. For this reason, because the abatement cases cited
were handed down before the fourteenth amendment was held to guarantee
against searches and seizures, and also because the cases did not involve
dwelling houses, nothing of much value to the present discussion seems to
turn on them.
Aside from the fact that the Frank case differs from other fourth amendment cases by not involving a search for criminal evidence, it may manifest
for students of constitutional law another facet, more elusive but of more
potential power. Many observers could agree that the News PublishingCo.
case, supra, is at least as restrictive of corporate freedom as Frank is of
personal freedom. Some of the Court, spoken for by Justice Douglas,
would seemingly use different standards as respects protecting businesses
and private homes. Perhaps then the case represents a swing toward equal
treatment, though it may be wished that both businesses and individuals
could have been accorded the level of protection justice Douglas sought for
individuals in his dissent in the Frank case. The time for that, however,
was when News Publishingwas decided.
The second line of inquiry in assessing Frank v. Maryland is the search
for historical antecedents to the fourth amendment. Since no Supreme
Court decision prior to the Frank case passed on the constitutionality of
health inspections, did the drafters of the fourth amendment intend to include them within the appellation "unreasonable searches and seizures"?
justice Murphy once ventured the opinion that the fourth amendment
was inspired by general warrants, writs of assistance, and lettres de cachet.".
No doubt these played the lead role in bringing about the amendment,
though it might be supposed that lettres de cachet contributed more to the
sixth amendment than the fourth.3 2 In England general warrants 8 were of
some frequency up to about 1765. a ' In that year two great cases, Leach v.
2s Ibid.
29 North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
30 Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 Adt. 595, appeal dismissed on ground of no
substantial federal question, 299 U.S. 506 (1936).
31 Dissent in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 n. 5 (1942).
32 One form of lettre de cachet was more than a warrant and was actually an order
for criminal sentencing, specifying no particular offense and having a blank space, to
be filled in by some officer, for the name of the accused. LAssox, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 50

n. 125 (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Ser.
LV, No. 2, 1937).
33 General warrants authorized the arrest of any person and the seizure of any
evidence having to do with a specified crime. They were returnable to the official
who
issued them. For an example, see Wilkes' Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 982 (1763).
3
4LAssoN, supra note 32, at 13-50; Leach v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1002, 1027
(1765).
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3
Money3 and Entick v. Carrington,
" spelled the end of their use. Dryden
Leach, a writer suspected of authoring a "seditious libel" on George III,
was arrested on a general warrant, taken into custody, and held four days.
In Leach's action of false imprisonment against the arresting officers, the
court held only that the arrest was illegal because Leach did not actually
write the libel and hence was not the person described in the warrant. But
the court left no doubt it disapproved of general warrants. Soon Entick v.
Carrington,supra, an action of trespass against officers who seized papers
from a private home on a general warrant, gave a direct holding to that
effect. It stated the fundamental proposition that search warrants must
describe7 precisely the place to be searched and the criminal evidence
3
sought.
In colonial America it was the writ of assistance 8 which generated
popular indignation, especially in Massachusetts.89 This form of writ was
considerably worse than the general warrant used in England and, to salt
the colonists' wounds, was directed chiefly at stamping out the important
industry-for it really was such-of molasses smuggling.40 It is a fact of
American history that these writs of assistance were a major incitement to
the War of Independence.4 1 This is not to say they were the only evil at
which the fourth amendment was aimed, because its language is in two
clauses, one guaranteeing protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the other specifying the kind of warrants to issue.4 2 But the
historical events just preceding its adoption are a strong indication these
writs were poignantly in the drafters' minds. It is interesting to note that
article 14 of the 1780 Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts, the state
which had the worst experience with the writs, is very similar to the fourth
amendment, using the words "unreasonable searches and seizures."' t
Nowhere has any evidence been found directly connecting the fourth
amendment with health inspections or other similar entries. Indeed the
85 Ibid.
16 19 How.St. Tr.1030 (1765).
87 "If bels may be seized, it ought

to be laid down with precision, when, where,
upon what charge, against whom, by what magistrate, and in what stage of the prose-

cution." Id. at 1071.

88 This writ enabled the holder, generally a revenue officer looking for smuggled
goods, to search anywhere anytime for evidence of crime. The writ was good for the
life of the then king plus six months and did not require return of seized goods to
a magistrate. It directed local constables to assist the holder; hence the term "assistance" or "assistants." 1 COOLEY, CONSTrrUTONAL LrIMTATONS 610-636 (8th ed. 1927).
39A courtroom speech against writs of assistance delivered by James Otis, Jr., in
Boston in 1761 was apparently the thing that prompted John Adams to join the
struggle for liberty. 2 ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAms 124 n. 1 and 521-525

(1850).

401 MoRIsoN AND CommAGER, THE GRowTH OF THE A~mRICAN

155 (1942).

REPUBI-LIC 147 and

41 BEARD AND BEARD, THE RISE OF AmIucA CIVLIzATiON 217-219 (1946).
42 This came about in an interesting way. When the fourth amendment was being

drafted, the House had originally approved a one-clause form merely specifying the

contents of warrants. Then Benson of New York, chairman of a committee, redrafted
it in its present form, in which it was enacted by both House and Senate and ratified

by the
states. LAssoN, supra note 32, at 101-103.
8

- Id. at 82 n.15.
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history of general warrants and writs of assistance, against which the
fourth amendment is obviously directed, is heady stuff, beside which the
Baltimore health inspection in the Frank case hardly casts a shadow.
Dryden Leach was pulled from his bed at night and hustled away.4 ' Entick
was carried out of his home sitting in his chair, followed by his personal
papers, including his will and pocketbook, in a sack."5 The tumult of the
events leading up to the American Revolution does not need recounting.
The historical background to the fourth amendment does not directly rule
out the possibility that the framers aimed it against health inspections. But
neither does it show they did, and it suggests they had several other worse
infractions of liberty in mind.
To summarize, some conclusions, believed warranted by the foregoing
discussion, will be drawn. Frank v. Maryland should be viewed as an
original contribution to American constitutional law. Though it may not
be said for sure that the case correctly interprets history, it probably does
and at least cannot be said to be wrong on this score. It is connected by
analogy with other fourth amendment cases but is not governed by any one
of them. Perhaps it represents a Supreme Court trend toward less emphasis
on private, as compared with business, freedom from unreasonable searches.
The distinguishing fact seems to be that there was no search for criminal
evidence, but those who would rely on the case must be cautioned not to
think it establishes any general rule that all searches not intended to produce
evidence are valid. The Court also pointed out that regulation of health is
an area of great public interest,'6 and the search was in a reasonable manner
and in the daytime. Other state court cases (Givner and Price, supra)
which might have been relied upon were not cited and so not expressly
sanctioned. And finally the decision was by a sharply divided court. This
is new law, and, though the issue is squarely decided, caution would require
the assumption for the present that it may not be extended beyond the facts
of the Frank case.
WILLrAm

B. STOEtUcic

44 2 MAY, THE CoNsrrrunoNAx. HisoR ov
_ENGLA
D 246 (1886).
45 Id. at 247.
46 For articles giving a picture of the need for municipal control in this area, see

Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 25 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 1 (1956), and
Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1115 (1956).

